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Abstract
This study explores the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies
on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian growth
model. We nd that when the number of rms is xed in the short run, patent breadth
and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth as in previous studies. However,
when the number of rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, R&D subsidies increase
economic growth but decrease the number of rms, whereas patent breadth expands
the number of rms but reduces economic growth. Therefore, R&D subsidy is perhaps
a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating
long-run economic growth.
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1 Introduction
What are the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth
and market structure? To explore this question, we consider a second-generation R&D-based
growth model, pioneered by Peretto (1998), Young (1998), Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom
(2000). To our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes patent breadth in a second-
generation R&D-based growth model. The model features two dimensions of technological
progress. In the vertical dimension, rms improve the quality of existing products. In
the horizontal dimension, rms invent new products. In this Schumpeterian growth model
with endogenous market structure (EMS) measured by the equilibrium number of rms, we
nd some interesting di¤erences between patent breadth and R&D subsidies. At the rst
glance, these two policy instruments should have similar e¤ects on innovation and economic
growth. Patent breadth improves incentives for innovation by increasing the private return to
R&D investment, whereas R&D subsidies improve incentives for innovation by reducing the
private cost of R&D investment. For example, an interesting study by Li (2001) shows that
both of these policy instruments contribute to increasing innovation and economic growth
in a quality-ladder growth model that features exogenous market structure. However, in a
Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, we nd that patent breadth and R&D subsidies
have drastically di¤erent implications on economic growth and market structure. Specically,
when the number of rms is xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies both
have positive e¤ects on economic growth as in previous studies. Interestingly, when the
number of rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, patent breadth expands the number
of rms but decreases economic growth, whereas R&D subsidies increase economic growth
but reduce the number of rms.
Intuitively, R&D subsidies decrease the cost of R&D investment and improve incentives
for R&D; therefore, a higher rate of R&D subsidies increases economic growth in the short
run and in the long run. As for an increase in patent breadth, it raises the prot margin of
monopolistic rms and provides more incentives for R&D in the short run. In the long run, it
encourages the entry of new rms, which in turn reduces the market size of each rm. Given
that the market size of a rm determines its incentives for innovation in the second-generation
R&D-based growth model,1 a larger patent breadth decreases long-run economic growth.
These contrasting long-run implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies suggest that
R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the
purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth. The negative e¤ect of patent protection
on innovation is consistent with case-study evidence in Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and
Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008). As for the positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies
on innovation, it is also consistent with empirical evidence; see for example, Hall and Van
Reenen (2000) for a survey of empirical studies.
This study relates to the literature on R&D-driven economic growth; see Romer (1990),
Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
for seminal studies. Subsequent studies in this literature often apply variants of the R&D-
based growth model to analyze the e¤ects of policy instruments, such as patent breadth and
1Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship between average rm
size and economic growth. See also Ha and Howitt (2007) and Madsen (2008) for other empirical studies
that support the second-generation R&D-based growth model.
2
R&D subsidies, on economic growth and innovation; see for example, Segerstrom (2000), Li
(2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Chu (2011) and Chu and
Furukawa (2011). However, these studies do not analyze the e¤ects of patent policy on
market structure.2 Therefore, the present study contributes to the literature with a novel
analysis of patent breadth in a Schumpeterian growth model in which market structure is
endogenous. Furthermore, we compare the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies
and nd that in a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, the long-run e¤ects of patent
breadth and R&D subsidies are drastically di¤erent suggesting the importance of taking
into consideration the endogeneity of market structure when performing policy analysis in
R&D-based growth models. ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Horii and Iwaisako (2007),
Furukawa (2007, 2010), Chu (2009), Chu et al. (2012) and Chu and Pan (2013) also nd
that increasing the strength of other patent policy levers, such as blocking patents and
patentability requirement, could have a negative e¤ect on economic growth. The present
study di¤ers from these previous studies that mostly focus on the long-run e¤ects of patent
policy and contributes to the literature by showing that EMS leads to di¤erent short-run
and long-run implications of patent protection on economic growth.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Schumpeterian growth
model with EMS. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. Section
4 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
In summary, the growth-theoretic framework is based on the Schumpeterian model with in-
house R&D and EMS in Peretto (2007, 2011). In this model, labor is used as a factor input
for the production of nal goods. Final goods are either consumed by households or used
as a factor input for R&D, entry and the production of intermediate goods. We incorporate
patent breadth into the model and analyze its di¤erent implications from R&D subsidies on
economic growth and market structure.
2.1 Households
In the economy, the population size is normalized to unity, and there is a representative
household who has the following lifetime utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCtdt, (1)
where Ct denotes consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The parameter  > 0
determines the rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to the
following asset-accumulation equation:
_At = rtAt + (1  )wtL  Ct. (2)
2See Peretto (1996, 1999) for seminal studies in the R&D-based growth model with EMS and Etro (2012)
for an excellent textbook treatment of this topic.
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At is the real value of assets owned by the household, and rt is the real interest rate. The
household has a labor endowment of L units and supplies them inelastically to earn a real
wage rate wt. The household also pays a wage-income tax wtL to the government. From
standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_Ct
Ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final goods
We follow Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2008) and Peretto (2007, 2011) to assume that nal
goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:3
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt]
1 di, (4)
where f; g 2 (0; 1) and Xt(i) denotes intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]. The productivity
of intermediate good Xt(i) depends on its quality Zt(i) and also on the average quality
Zt  1Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(i)di of all intermediate goods capturing R&D spillovers. The degree of
technology spillovers is determined by 1   . From prot maximization, the equilibrium
wage rate is determined by
wt = (1  )Yt=L, (5)
and the conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) =


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt, (6)
where pt(i) is the price ofXt(i) and the price of Yt is normalized to unity. Perfect competition
implies that nal goods producers pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di to intermediate goods rms.
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Existing intermediate goods rms produce di¤erentiated goods with a technology that re-
quires one unit of nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods Xt(i). Following
Peretto (2011), we assume that the rm in industry i incurs Zt units of nal goods as a xed
operating cost, where Zt is aggregate technology as dened above. This specication implies
that managing facilities are more expensive to operate in a technologically more advanced
3Peretto (2007, 2011) consider a slightly di¤erent production function that replaces L=Nt by lt(i), which
denotes labor that uses intermediate goods Xt(i). Given that lt(i) = L=Nt in equilibrium, we follow the more
direct specication with L=Nt in Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2008). Peretto (2013) considers a more general
specication with L=Nt , where  2 (0; 1) inversely measures the social return to varieties. Our result of a
long-run negative e¤ect of patent breadth on economic growth is robust to this generalization. Derivations
are available upon request.
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economy. To improve the quality of its products, the rm invests Rt(i) units of nal goods
in R&D. The innovation process is
_Zt(i) = Rt(i). (7)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt(i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
rvdv

u(i)du. (8)
The dividend ow t(i) at time t is
t(i) = [pt(i)  1]Xt(i)  Zt   (1  s)Rt(i), (9)
where the parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies. The monopolistic rmmaximizes
(8) subject to (6) and (7). The current-value Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is
Ht(i) = t(i) + t(i) _Zt(i). (10)
We solve this optimization problem in the Appendix and nd that the unconstrained prot-
maximizing markup ratio is 1=. To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we impose an
upper bound  > 1 on the markup ratio.4 Therefore, the equilibrium price becomes
pt(i) = min f; 1=g . (11)
For the rest of this study, we assume that  < 1=. In this case, a larger patent breadth 
leads to a higher markup, and this implication is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiros (1990)
seminal insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price. Finally, the return
to in-house R&D is increasing in the market size of each rm measured by employment per
variety L=Nt.
Lemma 1 The return to in-house R&D is given by
rt =

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
. (12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
4Intuitively, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts potential imitators. However, stronger patent
protection increases the production cost of imitative products and allows monopolistic rms to charge a
higher markup without losing market share to these potential imitators; see also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier
(2002), Chu (2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation.
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2.4 Entrants
A rm that is active at time t must have been born at some earlier date. Following the
standard treatment in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt(i) = Zt
for i 2 [0; Nt], by assuming that any new entry at time t has access to the level of aggregate
technology Zt.5 A new rm pays a setup cost Xt(i)F , where F > 0 is a cost parameter, to
set up its operation and introduce a new variety of products to the market.6 We refer to this
process as entry. Suppose entry is positive (i.e., _Nt > 0). Then, the no-arbitrage condition
is7
Vt(i) = Xt(i)F . (13)
The familiar Bellman equation implies that the return to entry is
rt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
2.5 Government
The government chooses an exogenous rate of R&D subsidies s 2 (0; 1). The government
collects tax revenue Tt from the household, and the amount of tax revenue is
Tt = wtL = (1  )Yt, (15)
where  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous tax rate on wage income. The balanced-budget condition is
Tt = Gt + s
Z Nt
0
Rt(i)di, (16)
where Gt is unproductive government consumption that changes endogenously as in Peretto
(2007).
2.6 Aggregation
The resource constraint on nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + _NtXtF +Gt. (17)
5See Peretto (1998, 1999, 2007) for a discussion of the symmetric equilibrium being a reasonable equilib-
rium concept in this class of models.
6The setup cost is proportional to the new rms initial volume of output. This assumption captures
the idea that the setup cost depends on the amount of productive assets required to start production; see
Peretto (2007) for a discussion.
7We follow the standard approach in this class of models to treat entry and exit symmetrically (i.e., the
scrap value of exiting an industry is also Xt(i)F ); therefore, Vt(i) = Xt(i)F always holds. If Vt(i) > Xt(i)F
(Vt(i) < Xt(i)F ), then there would be an innite number of entries (exits).
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Substituting (6) into (4) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production function:8
Yt = (=)
=(1 ) ZtL, (18)
where the second equality uses markup pricing pt(i) = .
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fAt; Ct; Yt; Xt(i); Rt(i)g and prices frt; wt; pt(i); Vt(i)g
such that the following conditions are satised:
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; wtg as given;
 competitive nal goods rms maximize prots taking fpt(i); wtg as given;
 incumbents in the intermediate goods sector choose fpt(i); Rt(i)g to maximize fVt(i)g
taking frtg as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking fVt(i)g as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that At = NtVt; and
 the market-clearing condition of nal goods holds.
2.8 Dynamics
In this subsection, we analyze the dynamics of the model. In the Appendix, we show that
the consumption-output ratio Ct=Yt jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value. This
equilibrium property simplies the analysis of transition dynamics.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value:
(C=Y ) = (1  )(1  ) + F

. (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equations (18) and (19) imply that for any given  and  ,
_Zt
Zt
=
_Yt
Yt
=
_Ct
Ct
= rt   , (20)
8We could follow Peretto (2007, 2013) to consider an extension that allows for a positive externality e¤ect
of Nt on Yt. Our main results are robust to this modication although the dynamic analysis becomes more
complicated. Derivations are available upon request.
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where the last equality uses the Euler equation in (3). Combining (12) and (20), we derive
the equilibrium growth rate given by
gt 
_Zt
Zt
= max
(

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
  ; 0
)
, (21)
which is increasing in the market size of each rm measured by L=Nt.9 From (21), the growth
rate gt is strictly positive if and only if
Nt < N  (  1) (=)
1=(1 ) L
(1  s) .
Intuitively, innovation requires each rms market size to be large enough so that it is prof-
itable for rms to do in-house R&D. A su¢ cient market size requires the number of rms to
be below a critical level N . If Nt > N , then there are too many rms diluting the return to
R&D. As a result, rms do not invest in R&D, and the growth rate of vertical innovation is
zero. In the Appendix, we provide the derivations of the dynamics of Nt, which is a state
variable.
Lemma 3 The dynamics of Nt is determined by a one-dimensional di¤erential equation:10
_Nt
Nt
=
8<:
 1
F
 
h
+ (1  s) _Zt
Zt
i
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 )F
   if Nt < N
 1
F
   Nt=L
(=)1=(1 )F
   if Nt > N
9=; . (22)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The di¤erential equation in (22) shows that given any initial value, Nt gradually converges
to its steady-state value denoted as N.11 On the transition path, the number of rms
determines each rms market size L=Nt and the equilibrium growth rate gt according to
(21). When Nt evolves toward the steady state, gt also gradually converges to its steady-
state value g. The following proposition derives the steady-state values fN; gg.
Proposition 1 Under the parameter restrictions  < min f=(1  s); (1  )(  1)=Fg,12
the economy is stable and has a positive and unique steady-state value of Nt. The steady-state
values fN; gg are given by
N(
+
; s
 
) =

(1  )   1
1=(1 )
  F
1=(1 )

1=(1 )
  (1  s)L > 0, (23)
9Considering data on employment, R&D personnel, and the number of establishments in the US for the
period from 1964 to 2001, Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the
theoretical prediction from this class of models that economic growth is increasing in average rm size.
10It is useful to note that _Zt=Zt is a function of Nt given by (21).
11In this model, we have assumed zero population growth, so that Nt converges to a steady state. If we
assume positive population growth, it would be the number of rms per capita that converges to a steady
state instead, and our main results would be unchanged.
12These parameter restrictions would depend on a larger set of parameters if we parameterize R&D pro-
ductivity in (7) and the productivity in producing intermediate goods from nal goods. For simplicity, we
have implicitly normalized these productivity parameters to unity.
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g(
 
; s
+
) =
(  1)
(1  )(  1)  F


1  s   

   > 0. (24)
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Patent breadth versus R&D subsidies
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. In Section 3.1,
we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth on the number of rms, the market size of each rm
and economic growth. In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. In Section
3.3, we introduce a subsidy to entry and explore its e¤ects.
3.1 E¤ects of patent breadth
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth. Equation (21) shows that the
initial impact of a larger patent breadth  on the equilibrium growth rate gt is positive be-
cause Nt is xed in the short run. This result captures the standard positive e¤ects of patent
breadth on monopolistic prots and innovation as in previous studies, such as Li (2001), Chu
(2011), Chu and Furukawa (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013). However, in the long
run, market structure is endogenous and the number of rms adjusts. In particular, the
higher prot margin attracts the entry of rms, which in turn reduces each rms market
size L=Nt and decreases incentives for innovation. This negative entry e¤ect dominates the
positive prot-margin e¤ect such that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g becomes
lower than the original steady-state level. Therefore, allowing for the endogeneity of market
structure, the present study extends previous studies in the literature by demonstrating the
contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects of patent breadth on economic growth. Proposi-
tion 2 summarizes the results. Figures 1 and 2 plot the transition paths of fgt; Ntg when 
increases at time t.
Proposition 2 The initial e¤ect of a larger patent breadth on economic growth is positive
as a result of increased monopolistic prots. In the long run, higher prot margin attracts the
entry of rms and reduces the market size of each rm. The smaller market size decreases
incentives for innovation and the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given Nt, @gt=@ > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show
that @N=@ > 0 and @g=@ < 0.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
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3.2 E¤ects of R&D subsidies
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. Equation (21) shows that the
initial impact of a higher rate of R&D subsidies s on the equilibrium growth rate gt is positive
givenNt. On the transition path, the higher rate of R&D subsidies makes in-house R&Dmore
attractive relative to entry. As a result, resources reallocate from entry to in-house R&D,
and the number of rms decreases. The smaller number of rms increases each rms market
size, which further improves incentives for in-house R&D. This positive market-size e¤ect
strengthens the initial positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies such that the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g increases further way from the initial level. Therefore, the endogeneity of
market structure amplies the positive e¤ects of R&D subsidies on economic growth. Peretto
(1998) and Segerstrom (2000) also analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model. Segerstrom (2000) nds that R&D subsidies can have either
positive or negative e¤ects on economic growth, and this interesting result is driven by
the tradeo¤ between quality improvement and variety expansion on economic growth. In
contrast, economic growth is solely based on quality improvement in the present study and
in Peretto (1998), who also nds a positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies on economic growth.
Peretto and Connolly (2007) provide a theoretical justication that quality improvement is
the only plausible engine of economic growth in the long run. Proposition 3 summarizes the
results. Figures 3 and 4 plot the transition paths of fgt; Ntg when s increases at time t.
Proposition 3 The initial e¤ect of a higher rate of R&D subsidies on economic growth is
positive. In the long run, rms exit the market, and the market size of each rm increases.
The larger market size further strengthens incentives for innovation and increases the steady-
state growth rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows that for a given Nt, @gt=@s > 0. Equations (23) and (24) show
that @N=@s < 0 and @g=@s > 0.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
3.3 Extension: E¤ects of entry subsidies
In this subsection, we extend the baseline model by allowing for a subsidy to entry denoted
by e 2 (0; 1). In this case, the entry condition in (13) becomes
Vt(i) = (1  e)Xt(i)F . (25)
Furthermore, the governments balanced-budget condition is modied to
Tt = Gt + s
Z Nt
0
Rt(i)di+ e _NtXtF . (26)
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The rest of the model is the same as before. Following the same procedures as before,13 we
derive the same equilibrium growth rate in (21) and the steady-state equilibrium number of
varieties given by
N(e
+
) =

(1  )   1
1=(1 )
  (1  e)F
1=(1 )

1=(1 )
  (1  s)L > 0, (27)
which is naturally increasing in the entry subsidy rate e. Given that the equilibrium growth
rate is given by (21) as before and does not directly depend on e, an increase in entry subsidies
does not a¤ect economic growth initially. However, given that entry subsidies attract the
entry of rms and reduce the market size of each rm, the equilibrium growth rate gradually
decreases during the transition path and converges to a lower steady-state value. If we think
of entry as horizontal R&D, then this analysis implies that horizontal R&D subsidies can
be harmful to economic growth, and this nding is consistent with Peretto (2007). In other
words, in order for R&D subsidies to have a positive e¤ect on economic growth, policymakers
need to design a subsidy (or tax-deduction) system that distinguishes between di¤erent types
of R&D activities.
For the rest of this subsection, we consider symmetric R&D and entry subsidies by setting
e = s = s. Given that entry subsidies e have no e¤ect on the initial growth rate, an increase
in s must have the same initial positive e¤ect on the growth rate gt as R&D subsidies. As
for the long-run e¤ect on the number of rms, (27) becomes
N(s) =

(1  ) (  1)  (1  s)F
  (1  s)



1=(1 )
L > 0, (28)
which is decreasing (increasing) in s if the following inequality holds:
(1  ) (  1) > (<) F .
If N is decreasing in s, then the long-run e¤ect of s on g must be positive. If N is
increasing in s, then a higher rate of subsidies s would have a negative indirect e¤ect on
long-run growth through entry partly o¤setting the direct positive e¤ect of s on growth.
Substituting (28) into (21) yields
g =
(  1)
1  s| {z }
direct e¤ect of s
  (1  s)
(1  ) (  1)  (1  s)F| {z }
indirect e¤ect of s
  , (29)
which is increasing in s if and only if the following inequality holds:14
 (1  ) (  1)  (1  s)[2  (1  s)]F > 0.
Given the parameter restriction =(1  s) >  in Proposition 1, this inequality holds if  is
su¢ ciently small. In other words, the overall long-run growth e¤ect of symmetric R&D and
entry subsidies s is generally ambiguous. If the discount rate  is su¢ ciently small, then an
increase in s would have a positive e¤ect on long-run growth.
13The derivations are available upon request.
14It can be shown that (1  ) (  1) > F is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for this inequality to hold.
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the di¤erent implications of two important policy instru-
ments, patent breadth and R&D subsidies, on economic growth and market structure in a
scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. We nd that when the number of
rms is xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic
growth as in previous studies. However, when the number of rms adjusts endogenously in
the long run, these two commonly discussed policy instruments have surprisingly opposing
e¤ects on economic growth and market structure. Specically, patent breadth decreases
economic growth but expands the number of rms, whereas R&D subsidies reduce the num-
ber of rms but increase economic growth. These contrasting e¤ects of patent breadth and
R&D subsidies suggest that R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than
patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating economic growth. This nding is consistent
with evidence from empirical studies and case studies discussed in the introduction. Given
our result that the endogeneity of market structure leads to di¤erent short-run and long-run
e¤ects of patent breadth, it is important for policymakers to take into consideration the
di¤erent implications of patent policy reform for di¤erent time horizons.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (6), (9) and the constraint pt(i)   into (10) yields
Ht(i) = [pt(i) 1]


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt Zt (1 s)Rt(i)+t(j)Rt(i)+t(j)[pt(i) ],
(A1)
where t(j) is the multiplier on pt(i)   and t(j) = 0 if pt(i) < . The rst-order conditions
include
@Ht(i)
@pt(i)
= 0, pt(i) = min f; 1=g , (A2)
@Ht(i)
@Rt(i)
= 0, t(i) = 1  s, (A3)
@Ht(i)
@Zt(i)
= [pt(i)  1]


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t L=Nt = rtt(i)  _t(i). (A4)
Substituting (A3) and the constrained monopolistic price pt(i) =  < 1= from (A2) into
(A4) yields
rt =

1  s
"
(  1)



1=(1 )
L
Nt
#
, (A5)
where we have also applied the symmetry condition Zt(j) = Zt.
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting Vt = XtF from (13) into At = NtVt yields
At = NtXtF =
ptNtXt
pt
F =
Yt

F , (A6)
where the last equality uses pt =  and ptXtNt = Yt. Using (A6) and (2), we obtain
_Yt
Yt
=
_At
At
= rt + 
(1  )wtL  Ct
YtF
. (A7)
Substituting the Euler equation and wtL = (1  )Yt into (A7) yields
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
= 
Ct=Yt
F
 


(1  )(1  )
F
+ 

. (A8)
Therefore, the dynamics of Ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that Ct=Yt
must jump to its steady-state value in (19).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (9), (13) and pt(i) =  into (14) yields
rt =
  1
F
  Zt + (1  s)Rt
XtF
+
_Xt
Xt
, (A9)
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where we have applied _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt. Substituting pt(i) =  into (6) yields
Xt =
Zt
Nt



1=(1 )
L, (A10)
where we have applied Zt(i) = Zt. Substituting (7) and (A10) into (A9) yields
rt =
  1
F
 
"
+ (1  s)
_Zt
Zt
#
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 ) F
+
_Zt
Zt
 
_Nt
Nt
, (A11)
where we have used _Xt=Xt = _Zt=Zt  _Nt=Nt. Substituting (20) into (A11) yields the dynamics
of Nt given by
_Nt
Nt
=
  1
F
 
"
+ (1  s)
_Zt
Zt
#
Nt=L
(=)1=(1 ) F
  . (A12)
Equation (A12) describes the dynamics of Nt when Nt < N . When Nt > N , _Zt=Zt = 0 as
shown in (21).
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that under
 < min f=(1  s); (1  )(  1)=Fg, there exists a stable, unique and positive steady-
state value of Nt. Substituting (21) into the rst equation of (22) yields
_Nt
Nt
=
(1  s)  
(=)1=(1 ) F
Nt
L
+
(1  )(  1)
F
  . (A13)
Because Nt is a state variable, the dynamics of Nt is stable if and only if (1   s) < .
Solving _Nt = 0, we obtain the steady-state value of Nt in an economy with positive in-house
R&D given by
N =

(1  )(  1)
F
  

(=)1=(1 ) F
  (1  s) L. (A14)
Given (1 s) < , (A14) shows that N > 0 if and only if  < (1 )( 1)=F . Combining
this inequality with (1  s) < , we have
 < min


1  s;
(1  )(  1)
F

.
Finally, substituting (A14) into (21) yields
gt =
(  1)
(1  )(  1)  F


1  s   

  , (A15)
which is positive if and only if the following inequality holds:
(1  s)F2   (1  s)(  1)+ (  1) > 0,
and this inequality holds if  is su¢ ciently small (or su¢ ciently large).
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